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LOT NETwork Too Big for Antitrust? 
by ROBERT YANG* 
 
ABSTRACT 
While companies, inventors, institutions, and other patent holders have 
generally monetized their patents in some way, some entities have found that 
asserting patent rights is a lucrative alternative to traditional avenues of 
intellectual property (“IP”) monetization.  Patent assertion lawsuits, especially 
those initiated by Patent Assertion Entities (“PAE”), have grown at an 
exponential rate over the last decade. These lawsuits have caused disruptions 
from industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to the auto-making industry 
through damage awards in litigation and “preempting” companies to divert 
funding towards potential future litigation.  The License on Transfer Network 
(“LOT Network”) is one of many solutions developed to combat PAE — 
specifically by cross-licensing patents between members of the pool.  Google 
and some patent pooling systems are no strangers to violating antitrust laws.  
This paper looks at how an attacking PAE or an antitrust watchdog would react 
to this particular type of licensing agreement. 
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I. Introduction 
Patent troll activity — the enforcement of patent rights against an 
accused infringer by a nonpracticing entity — has been on the rise for some 
time.  In response, operating companies have developed numerous strategies 
to protect themselves against these Patent Assertion Entities (“PAE”).  The 
License on Transfer Network (“LOT Network”) is but one of these attempts 
to combat the rising PAE threat.  The LOT Network tries to reduce PAE 
litigation by removing the number of viable patents available to PAEs.  
Member companies essentially enter into a conditional cross-licensing 
arrangement; this functions to deter improper infringement claims since the 
patent cannot be asserted against other LOT members.1  This paper will look 
at how antitrust regulators or attacking PAEs might react to this particular 
licensing arrangement. 
This note is divided into three sections.  Section I will explain the LOT 
Network model and how it proposes to combat the PAE problem.  Section II 
will provide a general framework behind the crossroads of Antitrust and 
Patent Law.  Next, Section III will explain how this framework is applied to 
the LOT network.  Finally, we conclude that the pro-competitive benefits of 
the LOT Network should help it avoid any serious antitrust issues. 
To “promote the progress of science and useful arts, the U.S. patent 
system gives inventors a limited monopoly to exploit their invention.”2  
Essentially, patent holders gain a legally enforceable right to commercially 
exploit their invention — usually by excluding others from practicing the 
patented invention or licensing these rights to another entity.3  However, 
some patent right holders, either owners or assignees, do not utilize the patent 
for research or manufacture.  Instead, these entities “pursue other goals of 
interest to their founders and investors.”4  These non-practicing entities fall 
under two broad categories: (1) research institutions that license out 
 
1. See LOT Network, http://www.lotnet.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter LOT 
Website]. 
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3.  See USPTO, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS (2015), http://www. 
uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents. 
 4.  Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2011). 
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innovations instead of manufacturing products and (2) entities that exist to 
acquire patents for the sole purpose of asserting against operating companies.5 
The second category is sometimes referred to as PAEs, or colloquially, 
patent trolls. 
In the words of former U.S. President Barack Obama, PAEs “. . . don’t 
actually produce anything themselves . . . [but] just trying to essentially 
leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some 
money out of them.”6  PAEs do not develop or practice patents themselves, 
and instead acquire patents for the sole purpose of obtaining profit through 
patent assertion litigation.7  In other words, the PAE business model is based 
solely on “purchasing and asserting patents against manufacturers already 
using the technology, rather than developing and transferring technology.”8  
In this broken framework, some observers believe that abuse by PAEs is just 
a symptom of the current patent system’s defects.9 
The year preceding this writing, 2015, was the second biggest year for 
patent suits. By one estimate, patent assertion litigation in 2015 saw the most 
patent disputes filed in U.S. history — Unified Patents estimates that 5,769 
were filed in Federal Court and 1,796 disputes were filed with the Patent 
Trademark and Appeals Board at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”).10  For reference, these lawsuits account for two-thirds of all 
cases filed in the Federal District Court system.11  Another report found that 
between 2005 and 2014, PAE initiated lawsuits increased 500%.12  Today, 
 
 5.  Id. at 1; see also Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives 
and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2009) (“The 
term NPE generally refers to a patentee that does not make products or ‘practice’ its inventions.”). 
 6.  See Watch: President Obama Answers Your Questions in a Google+ Hangout, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Feb 2, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/14/watch-president-
obama-answers-your-questions-google-hangout. 
 7.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE 8 (2011), www.ftc. 
gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf; see also Marianna Galstyan, Who Are Patent Trolls & 
How Do They Work?, INVESTOPIA (July 15, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles 
/investing/071515/who-are-patent-trolls-how-do-they-work.asp. 
 8.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7. 
 9.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013); see also Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion 
Entities and Antitrust: A Competition Cure For A Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 501 (2014). 
 10.  2015 Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED PATENTS (Dec. 31, 2015), http://unified 
patents.com/2015-year-end-report.  Note that Unified Patents also includes litigation initiated by 
PAEs or Declaratory Judgments initiated by operating companies against PAEs. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  PatentFreedom: Latest NPE Litigation Activity Update, ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS BLOG 
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.articleonepartners.com/blog/patentfreedom-latest-npe-litigation-activ 
ity-update/. 
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those lawsuits are estimated to cost U.S. publicly traded firms roughly $80 
billion annually — with $29 billion in direct litigation expenditures.13  
Indeed, the PAE problem can only get worse as PAEs continue to acquire 
more patents, usually from operating companies.14 
In the absence of meaningful action by Congress, the USPTO, or the 
judicial system, private entities have formulated their own solutions in 
response to the PAE problem.15  Generally, these “alternative licensing 
alternatives” can be categorized as: (1) defensive patent aggregators (“patent 
pools”), (2) patent pledges, and (3) patent troll insurance.16  Patent pools are 
private contractual agreements where separate patent owners transfer their 
rights into a common holding company to jointly license their products.17  
Patent pledges are voluntary public commitments made by companies to 
license their own patents in a particular way in order to support open 
innovation.18  Recently, some defensive patent aggregators and some 
organizations for advertisers began offering litigation insurance against PAE 
initiated lawsuits.19 
The LOT Network is unique that it is a conditional cross-licensing 
arrangement that falls somewhere between the alternative-licensing 
categories of cross-licensing agreement, patent pools, and patent pledges.  
Cross licensing agreements are similar to patent pools, except that instead of a 
common holding company, companies mutually execute overlapping patent 
rights to each other.20  As explained below, this note will not differentiate 
between the different technology licensing arrangements. 
The LOT Network was designed to curb abuse by PAEs by reducing 
the amount of viable patents available to PAEs.  Under the LOT Agreement, 
 
 13.  James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 387 (2014). 
 14.  Dan McCurdy, Sr. Vice Pres., RPX presentation at the 2015 IP Counsel Café Spring 
Meeting in Palo Alto, Cal. (Apr. 22-24, 2015); LOT Website, supra note 1; see also Ewing & 
Feldman, supra note 4 (Intellectual Venture, for example, obtains patents from turnkey licensing 
services for small- to medium-sized businesses that they then assert against other operating 
companies while paying the licensor a cash payment plus a percentage of income earned.). 
 15.  See Marta Belcher & John Casey, Hacking the Patent System: A Guide to Alternative 
Patent Licensing for Innovators, JUELSGAARD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INNOVATION CLINIC 
(May 2014), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/05/29/hacking_the_patent_system.pdf. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1340 (1996); see also Ewing & Feldman, 
supra note 4. 
 18.  See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47(3) ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 546 (2015). 
 19.  See Belcher & Casey, supra note 15. 
 20.  Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE L.J. 360, 369 (1999). 
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member companies grant each other a license to all of their patents, but that 
license only becomes effective when the patent leaves the network and falls 
into the hands of a PAE.21  As the LOT Network gains members, this effect 
will multiply as more companies bring their patent portfolios into the fold. 
This essay explores the LOT Network and how, like some cross-
licensing arrangements, it has the potential to be anticompetitive for entities 
outside the LOT Network.  First, patent acquisitions are subject to antitrust 
laws.22  Although antitrust laws do not impose a general prohibition against 
the alienability of property, they do prohibit discreet acquisitions that 
threaten to create or anticompetitively facilitate the exercise of market 
power.23  Second, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) [collectively herein “Agencies”] apply the same 
antitrust analysis with respect to patents (and other forms of intellectual 
property).24  Specifically, the Agencies evaluate anticompetitive effects 
under the rule of reason by finding market power, anticompetitive effects, 
and proof that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the pro-competitive 
benefits.25 
Antitrust laws sometimes prevent the assertion of certain intellectual 
property rights.26  However, the FTC has recognized that while IP licensing 
arrangements are “typically welfare-enhancing and pro-competitive, 
antitrust issues may nonetheless arise.”27  With big name members (some of 
which are probably competitors) like Google, Uber, Dropbox, Canon, JP 
Morgan Chase, Ford, and Solar City pooling more than 327,000 worldwide 
patent assets (including over 100,000 U.S. issued patents), the LOT Network 
may have market power in a properly defined market.28 
 
 21.  See LOT Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/faq/ 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [hereinafter LOT Agreement FAQs]. 
 22.  See SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Patent acquisitions are 
not immune for the antitrust laws.”). 
 23.  See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION 
AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/ 
joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf. 
 24.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf [hereinafter IP Licensing Guidelines or Guidelines]. 
 25.  See Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is it Patent Misuse?, 6 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117 (2004). 
 26.  See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979) (condemning 
bad faith and objectively baseless patent assertion by a monopolist). 
 27.  IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 7. 
 28.  Email from LOT Network Administration, Lot Network, Inc., to Robert Yang, Author, 
UC Hastings (Feb. 2, 2016, 14:25 PST) (on file with author). 
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If the LOT Network does have market power, it will be weighed against 
the pro-competitive benefits.  Another argument is that the LOT Network 
might reduce competition, restrict supply, or have an impermissible field of 
use restriction.  However, licenses are conditional; supply might not be 
impacted unless there is a transfer of patent to a PAE.  The LOT Network 
does not permit PAEs (a defined term) from entering the network, which 
might be seen as an impressible barrier to competition at first glance — after 
all, each and every entity that meet this requirement are per se excluded.  But, 
PAEs do not actually produce anything — they are not competitors. 
II. The LOT Network 
In 2004, Google, as part of a coalition of tech companies, launched the 
LOT Network in an effort to disarm PAEs.  Google describes the LOT 
Network as “an industry-led networked, royalty-free patent cross licensing 
agreement for transferred patents . . . [where] every company that 
participates grants a license to the other participants . . . when patents are 
transferred to non-participants.”29  The program is meant to protect 
participants against patent attacks brought by PAEs that obtains a LOT-
pledged patent, while preserving each member’s full use of their retained 
portfolio.30  The license functions like a covenant that runs with the land and 
attaches to the patent so it will always be enforceable if obtained by a PAE.  
Also, the LOT Agreement is administered by LOT Networks Inc., an 
independent third party company.31 
The LOT Network is unique in the sense that it has substantial aspects 
of a patent pool, a traditional cross-licensing arrangement, and a patent 
pledge. The LOT Network is similar to a pool in the sense that all members 
grant each other a conditional cross-license, but the patents are only fully 
vested upon a “triggering event” — mainly when control of a patent becomes 
owned or controlled by a PAE. Also, “PAE” is a defined term in the LOT 
Agreement. PAEs or “Assertion Entity” is defined as an entity and each of 
its affiliates who collectively derive more than half of their total consolidated 
gross revenue over a span of 12 months from patent assertion (another 
defined term).32 
 
 29.  Google Patent Programs: LOT Agreement, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/ 
licensing/lot/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  LOT Agreement Version 2.0, LOT NETWORK (Nov. 24, 2015), http://lotnet.com/ 
download-lot-agreement/ (“‘Assertion Entity’ means an Entity and each one of its affiliates if such 
Entity and all its Affiliates collectively derived from Patent Assertion more than half of their total 
consolidated gross revenue measured over the full twelve (12) months preceding a particular date 
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Each arrangement operates differently and has different tradeoffs for 
both companies and its impact on innovation.  The LOT Network can be seen 
either as a cross-licensing agreement, a patent pool, or a patent pledge (since 
full licenses are technically not given out up-front).  As the IP Licensing 
Guidelines does not make a meaningful distinction between cross-licensing 
and patent pools, the remainder of this note will not distinguish between 
these forms. 
Defensive patent aggregators (or patent pools), which include Unified 
Patents and RPX, use membership fees (or pulled resources) to buy patents 
to give perpetual licenses to its members to prevent subsequent patent 
holders from suing for infringement.33  This methodology ensures that the 
patent can never be asserted against the pool participants, as each member 
now possesses a perpetual license.  These entities are differentiated from 
PAEs because they only buy patents solely for defensive purposes and 
pledge to never offensively assert the patents they own.34  Also, some pools 
can challenge, invalidate, or amass prior art on patents.35  These companies, 
as well as other professional organizations, also provide insurance against 
patent troll litigation.36 
In contrast, patent pledges are usually more informal self-limiting 
commitments.  These are voluntary public commitments made by companies 
to license their own patents in a particular way in order to support open 
innovation.37  Traditionally, these are non-contractual commitments made to 
the public at large by a patent holder in the absence of direct compensation.38  
One prominent example was Tesla Motors decision to not “initiate patent 
lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use [Tesla’s] 
technology.”39  Other entities have initiated multilateral pledges where 
companies opt into networks that have the same pledge — these include the 
Defensive Patent License, Open Innovation Network, Twitter’s Innovator’s 
 
. . .  In addition, an Entity and each of its Affiliates will be deemed to be an Assertion Entity if the 
Entity or any of its Affiliates has, as of a particular date, a goal or plan approved by senior 
management or a senior executive (or under which the Entity has begun to receive revenue) to 
derive from Patent Assertion, either directly, or indirectly through one or more of its Affiliates, 
more than half of the total consolidated gross revenue of such Entity and its Affiliates collectively 
in any twelve (12) month period including or after that particular date.”). 
 33.  See Belcher & Casey, supra note 15. 
 34.  Id. at 4. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 21. 
 37.  See Contreras, supra note 18. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Elon Musk, All Our Patents Belong to You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014), http:// 
www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you. 
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Patent Agreement, The Patent Pledge, and The LOT Network.40  Patent pledges 
can make powerful public statement about a company’s value, but can also 
lower the patent’s market value.41 
LOT Network functions much like a hybrid patent pool and pledge 
where each member grants a license to each other, but becomes effective 
only upon a “triggering event.”  The LOT Network also functions like a 
pledge by having members promise that every patent they own will be 
subject to a license if sold to a PAE.  Members must grant, in a written 
contract, a portfolio-wide, present, fully vested and irrevocable license to all 
other LOT participants.42  This license is “worldwide, royalty-free, non-
exclusive, non-sublicensable, [and] non-transferable.43  In other words, 
members mutually grant each other a full but conditional license to their 
entire patent portfolio. 
However, the LOT Agreement does not require members to cross-
license each other in the traditional sense.44  Member companies can still 
cross-license to each other if they so choose, but there is no requirement in 
the LOT Agreement itself.  There are two exceptions for when the license 
does not become effective: (1) when the patent is transferred to another LOT 
member, or (2) when a transfer is part of a legitimate spinout or change of 
control to a non-PAE.45  The license condition is in place to protect against 
patent litigation whenever a PAE acquires a LOT-pledged patent to assert 
against members of the LOT Network.  Other than that restriction, LOT 
members retain all patent rights and can sell, assert, or license their patents 
to anyone (both in and out of the LOT Network), unless the buyer or 
exclusive licensee is or becomes a PAE.46 
Unlike traditional patent pledges, LOT members pay an annual fee 
based on their annual revenue in order to cover the costs of the program.  The 
annual fees ranges from $1,500 to $20,000 (at the time of this writing) and 
are generally low to encourage participation.47  Members must also sign the 
same LOT Agreement, which is nonnegotiable.48 
 
 40.  See Belcher & Casey, supra note 15, at 10. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See LOT Agreement Version 2.0, supra note 32. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Email from Ken Seddon, LOT Network CEO, Lot Network, Inc., to Robert Yang, Author, 
UC Hastings (Feb. 25, 2016, 15:24 PST) (on file with author). 
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LOT members can withdraw at any time, maybe to preserve an 
exclusive property right.  LOT members are required to give six months’ 
notice to withdraw, but get to keep the LOT licenses it acquired during its 
membership (except those that are transferred to PAEs after its 
withdrawal).49  Likewise, the pre-withdrawal patents are still subject to the 
obligations of the LOT Agreement, but only to members who were active at 
the time of withdrawal.50 
Primarily, the LOT Network was designed to protect members from 
privateering and reduce the number of patent infringement claims by PAEs.  
Privateering is the practice where an operating company sells or licenses a 
patent to a PAE to attack other operating companies.51  The LOT Network 
does not, however, protect against direct suits brought by another member or 
suits regarding patents acquired outside of the LOT Network.  Since the 
licenses only become effective upon a transfer to a PAE, LOT members can 
still assert their patents directly against other members.52 
By participating in the LOT Network, companies are able to obtain 
direct protection against PAE litigation in regards to patents owned by other 
LOT members.  Overall, the LOT Network intends to disrupt the current 
PAE cycle by reducing the amount of potential targets available to them.  
However, the LOT Network needs more operating companies to join in to 
further increase the long-term risk reduction. 
III. Crossroads of Antitrust and Patent Law 
Today, the relationship between antitrust laws and patent law is 
generally viewed as complimentary.  However, this was not always the case 
— the former prevailing view was that the relationship between antitrust and 
patent law were at odds with one another.53  Specifically, antitrust laws 
promote innovation by prohibiting specific actions that can harm 
competition — mainly monopolizing in a way that hurts consumers 
(generally raising prices or reducing output).54  Contrast this with patent law 
in the United States that confers the rights to exclude others from making, 
 
 49.  See LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Thomas L. Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by 
Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. (2011). 
 52.  See LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21. 
 53.  Xerox, 645 F.2d at 1203 (“[T]he primary purpose of the antitrust laws to preserve 
competition can be frustrated, albeit temporarily, by a holder’s exercise of the patent’s inherent 
exclusionary power during its term.”). 
 54.  See 15 U.S.C. §2; see also Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 35. 
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using, or selling the invention claimed by the patent for a limited period of 
time.55  As time went on, the legal perspective evolved and federal agencies 
have come to see patents as essentially comparable to any other form of 
property.56  In the words of the Federal Circuit, the “aims and objectives of 
patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds.  However, 
the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at 
encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”57 
The Sherman Antitrust Act has been used to prohibit unreasonable 
restraint on trade. Section One governs coordinated conduct that can be 
deemed to be anticompetitive — “every contract, commination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”58  Section Two reaches 
unilateral conduct that can lead to monopoly power and takes predatory steps 
to exclude rivals.  Specifically, “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony . . .”59  Although most enforcement actions are 
civil, the Sherman Act also empowers the DOJ to bring criminal suits.60  
Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of 
competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”61  The FTC usually 
enforces this act because it prohibits the same types of activities as the 
Sherman Act.62  This note will focus on Section One of the Sherman Act, 
namely potential coordinated conduct among the LOT Network member 
companies. 
The U.S. patent system exists to promote the progress of science, to 
promote the betterment of society.  This is accomplished by giving an 
inventor a monopolistic opportunity to exploit his invention.  However, a 
patent alone does not grant market power in the antitrust sense of the word.63  
For example, holding a patent on Linux does not create market power since 
 
 55.  35 U.S.C. §154 (1988). 
 56.  See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 2. 
 57.  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 58.  15 U.S.C §1 (2004). 
 59.  15 U.S.C §2 (2004). 
 60.  The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition 
-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). 
 61.  See 15 U.S.C. §§41-58. 
 62.  See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 60 (“Criminal prosecution are typically limited to 
intentional and clear violations such as when competitors fix prices or rig bids.”). 
 63.  Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. J. OF LAW & 
TECH. 5 (2008). 
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substitutes are readily available in, for example, Microsoft’s Windows and 
Apple’s OS. 
With this backdrop, the DOJ and FTC have recognized the difficulty 
posed by different patent licensing agreements.  This problem may be 
compounded by the fact that the LOT Network does not fit neatly into 
traditional categories.  In 1995, the Agencies published their IP Guidelines 
to assist “those who need to predict whether the Agencies will challenge a 
practice as anticompetitive.”64  The Guideline was published with the 
intention of balancing monopolistic behavior with continued innovation.65  
Specifically, the Guidelines sets forth three general principles: (1) 
intellectual property is treated like any other form of property, (2) intellectual 
property are presumed to not create market power in the antitrust context, 
and (3) combining complementary factors of production is generally seen as 
pro-competitive.66  The third principal seems to be an exception to the 
antitrust laws by permitting holders of blocking patents to pool their patents 
and jointly set a royalty rate.67 
It is also helpful to set forth a few definitions used in the Guidelines.  
First, there does not seem to be a difference between different cross-licensing 
arrangements.  The guideline simply states the “cross-licensing and pooling 
arrangements are agreements of two or more owners of different items of 
intellectual property to license one another or third parties.”68  As the LOT 
Network functions like a blend of those arrangements, this simplifies the 
analysis.  Second, the Guidelines differentiate between competing, 
complementary, and blocking patents.  Competing patent are usually 
substitutes for each other, complementary patents cover technologies that 
complement each other without being substitutes, and a patent is blocking 
when it cannot be practiced without infringing a basic patent.69  As it stands, 
the LOT Network’s “conditional patent pool” contains a large number of 
different patents — many of which are likely to be competing, 
complimentary, or blocking.  Third, the analysis is different depending on 
the horizontal or vertical relationship of the parties.  A vertical relationship, 
like a typical licensing agreement, has activities that are in a complimentary 
 
 64.  IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 1. 
 65.  Id. at 2. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id.; see also Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON 
REG. 359 (1999). 
 68.  Id. at 28. 
 69.  See generally Roger Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 
ANTITRUST L.J. 611 (1984). 
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relationship.70  The classic example being a component manufacturer 
licensed to combine with other components into the final product.  By 
contrast, a relationship is horizontal when parties would be actual or likely 
potential competitors in the absence of a license.71  Parties can have 
substantial aspects of both horizontal and vertical components.  The LOT 
Network has no barriers to entry for operating entities (besides a fee and 
meeting the definition of an operating company) and thus welcomes all 
parties (including direct competitors like Ford, Mazda, Subaru, Kia, and 
Hyundai). 
Antitrust concerns are most common when the licensor and licensee are 
in a horizontal relationship.  However, the existence of a horizontal 
relationship alone does not necessarily mean that an arrangement is 
anticompetitive.72  On the other hand, the Guidelines do recognize that by 
foreclosing access to or significantly raising the prices of an important input, 
may be an anticompetitive licensing restriction.73 
In the vast majority of cases, the Agencies evaluate licensing 
agreements under “the rule of reason.”74  In the other cases, where a 
restraint’s “nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive,” the 
Agencies will treat it as a per se violation without looking at the pro-
competitive aspects.75  The Guidelines list naked price fixing, output 
restraints, and market division among horizontal competitors, group 
boycotts, and resale price maintenance in license agreements as examples to 
per se unlawful restraints.76  When evaluating a restraint under the rule of 
reason, the Agencies will “inquire whether the restraint is likely to have 
anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably 
necessary to achieve pro-competitive benefits that outweigh those 
anticompetitive effects” or whether the parties could have achieved similar 
effects with less restrictive means.77  The reasoning is that economic theory 
holds that bringing certain patents together into common ownership can 
produce certain efficiencies.78 
 
 70.  See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 13. 
 71.  Id. at 14. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 16. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 76.  See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 16. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  “The Cournot-complements effect arises when multiple input owners each charge more 
than marginal cost for their input, thereby raising the price of the downstream product and reducing 
sales of that product.  Effectively, each input supplier imposes a negative externality on other 
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Unfortunately, if improperly managed, a patent pool can be used to 
stifle competition and raise prices for consumers.  Historical examples 
include John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, which was able to inflate prices and 
hold off competitors by using patent pools.79  Another example is when Summit 
and VISX pooled their patents on LASIK devices to extract $250 per treatment 
for devices using their patents until the FTC intervened.80 
An often-discussed case study is the Moving Pictures Expert Group 
Licensing Administration (“MPEG LA”) patent pool.  MPEG LA is a limited 
liability company that administers the pooling of digital video patents 
deemed essential for the MPEG-2 video compression technology.81  After 
seeking ex ante approval from the DOJ, MPEG LA received three DOJ 
Business Review Letters from 1997 to 1999.82  These DOJ letters are credited 
as the bedrock of modern antitrust counseling.83  In those letters, the DOJ 
approved the arrangement by finding that the pool would provide pro-
competitive benefits and mitigate anticompetitive damages.  The DOJ found 
that the structure of the pool was well suited because only essential patents 
were included, not substitutes.84 
The DOJ Letters also identified specific potential competitive concerns 
and provided a roadmap on how to minimize antitrust risk.  The ways a pool 
might restrict competition includes: restrictions among the pool participants, 
restrictions of downstream products incorporating pool patents, and 
restrictions in innovation among the pool.85  To prevent such concerns, the 
letters provides a guideline for when a patent pool may gain approval: (1) 
 
suppliers when it raises its price, because this reduces the number of units in the downstream 
product that are sold.”  Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013–14 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
 79.  See Alan Daley, The Consumer Interest in Patent Pools, THE HILL (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/202613-the-consumer-interest-in-patent-pools. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See MPEG LA PATENT POOL, http://www.mpegla.com; see, e.g., Carlson, supra note 67. 
 82.  See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Gerrard R. Beeney, 
Att’y Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) (on file with the U.S. Department of Justice) 
[hereinafter MPEG Letter]; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Gerrard 
R. Beeney, Att’y Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998) (on file with the U.S. Department of Justice) 
[hereinafter DVD 3C Business Review Letter]; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Dep’t of Just., to Casey R. Ramos, Att’y Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999) 
(on file with the U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter DVD 6C Business Review Letter].  (The 
letters refer to the individual members of the pool, but those pools are generally known by the 
number of companies in each pool); see also Howard Morse, Cross-Licensing and Patent Pools: 
Legal Framework and Practical Issues, ABA ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2002). 
 83.  See Morse, supra note 82. 
 84.  See MPEG Letter, supra note 82; see also Id. 
 85.  Id. 
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the patent must be valid and enforceable, (2) the pool must not aggregate 
competitive technologies and set a single price for them, and (3) an 
independent expert should determine if the patents are essential, and the pool 
must not disadvantage competitors or facilitate collusion.86 
The FTC’s IP Guidelines provided much needed clarity regarding the 
interaction of antitrust and patent laws.  In general, the formation of patent 
pools and other cross-licensing arrangements will be approved where the 
procompetitive benefits are compelling under the rule of reason.  However, 
enforcement action may be warranted in certain situations to protect public 
interests in competition.  Under this framework, the next section will analyze 
the LOT Network for potential antitrust liability. 
IV. LOT Network Under Antitrust Scrutiny 
In the DOJ’s IP Licensing guidelines, the Agencies’ main concerns are: 
(1) “horizontal coordination among the pool’s licensors [which] could lead 
to a reduction in price competition downstream products,” and (2) 
“combining patent rights in a pool [that] could discourage [research and 
development] [“R&D”], new product development, and cost-reducing 
process innovations.”87  Generally, the vast majority of these arrangements 
are evaluated under the rule of reason.88 
The rule of reason has been described as a “middle ground” between 
the traditional per se rules of illegality and the “quick-look approach” to 
evaluating antitrust litigation.89  There, the Court explained that “trial courts 
can structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on one hand, the use of 
antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other 
hand, consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the 
minimal light it may shed . . .”90  Nonetheless, the Court added that instead 
of a full rule of reason inquiry, lower courts should use a “sliding scale in 
appraising reasonableness, and as such the quality of proof required should 
vary with the circumstances.”91 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1, 67 (2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf [hereinafter Antitrust 
Enforcement & IP Rights]. 
 88.  See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24. 
 89.  See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 90.  Id. at 2238. 
 91.  Id. at 2237–2238 (internal quotation marks omitted)(citing California Dental Ass’n v. 
F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999)). 
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That being said, the rule of reason is applied in a series of steps in a 
traditional antitrust analysis.92  The first step is that the plaintiff must show 
that certain behavior restrains competition in a market.93  Second, if the 
plaintiff can meet this threshold, then the burden shifts to the defendant to 
show that the behavior serves a legitimate purpose.94  Then, the plaintiff has 
to rebut this by showing that the defendant can achieve the same objective with 
less restrictive alternatives.95  Finally, the court balances the harms and benefits 
of the restraint to determine if the restraint is anticompetitive.96 
A. Horizontal Coordination Leading to a Reduction in Price Competition 
Traditionally, the main threat of horizontal coordination is that 
competitors in the same market collude together to set prices.  The Agencies 
are specifically concerned that “horizontal coordination among the pool’s 
licensors could lead to a reduction in price competition among downstream 
products.”97  In other words, the core concern of antitrust law is to prevent 
horizontal competitors from harming downstream consumers by colluding 
to set prices.98  Even though a patent licensing arrangement might have 
strong pro-competitive benefits, the Agencies will look closely to see if a 
particular pooling arrangement can be anticompetitive.  For example, the 
Guidelines state that a pool can be anticompetitive if (1) it excludes firms 
such that those excluded cannot compete in the relevant market and (2) the 
pool participants collectively possess market power in a relevant market.99 
The LOT Network is an open conditional licensing pool that can attract 
(and actually has) competitors or potential competitors.100  The LOT 
Network describes itself as a “non-profit community of companies . . . who 
believe that good corporate citizens don’t monetize patents through patent 
trolls.”101  However, besides being members of the same network or 
community, there are no mechanisms for sharing information or 
coordinating actions among participants.  In fact, the LOT Agreement “does 
 
 92.  See Feldman, supra note 25, at 138. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 139. 
 97.  See Antitrust Enforcement & IP Rights, supra note 87, at 8. 
 98.  See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher et al., 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2005). 
 99.  See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 36. 
 100.  See LOT Website Members List, LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/lot-network-member-
list/ (For example, the LOT Network currently includes automakers Ford, Subaru, Mazda, Hyundai, 
and Kia). 
 101.  See LOT Website, supra note 1. 
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not create any relationship of agency, partnership or joint venture among the 
LOT Users or its Affiliates.”102  Other than through joining the LOT Network 
via the LOT Agreement, members companies do not have any formal 
mechanisms for communications.  Further, the LOT Agreement is written in 
a way that “obviate[s] the need of members to give notice, prepare covenants, 
or track patents that are transferred.”103  There is no requirement nor need for 
members to communicate with each other.  Also, the LOT Administration is 
not a centralized entity that can coordinate the actions of the participants or 
collectively price the pooled patents — it merely administers the LOT 
Agreement and maintains the network. 
It might prove difficult to name the LOT Network and its constituent 
members as an antitrust defendant.  Unlike organizations like RPX, LOT 
Network does not have a centralized structure where an entity can coordinate 
the activity of its members.104  Of course, a party could assert that the 
existence of the LOT Network is a conspiracy in itself to prevent certain 
companies from becoming LOT members.  Specifically, a member company 
must not derive 50% of revenue from patent assertion activity.105  However, 
proving antitrust liability would be difficult since the excluded companies 
are not actually competitors since PAEs, by definition, do not actually 
produce their own products.  If they did, they lose their most valuable 
defense against operating companies — they can now be countersued for 
infringing on one of their opponents’ patents.  Thus, it is very unlikely that 
an agency or court would find this type of exclusion to be anticompetitive. 
Operating companies can still use their patents however they wish and 
licenses will never vest so long as the patent holder is not a PAE.  The LOT 
Agreement does not place any restraints on trade and does not restrict the 
sale of any patents, even sales to PAEs.  There is the possibility that the 
patent itself might be devalued since it is not as a valuable to certain buyers, 
 
 102.  LOT Agreement Version 2.0, supra note 32, at ¶ 5.1. 
 103.  LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21. 
 104.  See Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No 12-CV-1143 YGR, 2013 WL 
6247594, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (RPX was accused of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy to 
monopolize a market by having members agree to not sell above a certain price for patents owned 
by Cascades). 
 105.  LOT Agreement Version 2.0, supra note 32, at ¶ 6.15 (“Patent Assertion” means either of 
the following assertions of rights under a Patent against another Entity: (i) asserting (including but 
not limited to via a written or oral demand) a claim of Infringement of such Patent for the primary 
purpose of deriving royalties or other monetary compensation under such Patent, or (ii) the 
commencement or subsequent pursuit of a claim, action or proceeding in a judicial, administrative 
or other governmental body, including but not limited to a court (in any country) or the U.S. 
International Trade Commission, based in whole or in part on a claim of Infringement of such 
Patent.). 
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but that is unlikely to deter innovation, as discussed below.  In fact, the pro-
competitive benefits of discouraging PAE acquisition of LOT-pledged 
patents might outweigh having a patent with decreased value.  Thus, it is 
doubtful that the LOT Network would be seen as impermissible horizontal 
coordination. 
B. Predatory Pricing 
The regulatory Agencies’ ultimate concern is that horizontal 
coordination will eventually lead to predatory pricing.  If the LOT Network 
is seen as impermissible horizontal coordination between competitors, the 
next step would be to see if this behavior leads to predatory pricing.  As the 
LOT Network does not set prices to patents and patent sales directly, it is 
unlikely that there would be any anticompetitive concerns. 
Although the LOT Network is unlikely to be found liable based on 
horizontal coordination, it would be helpful to discuss when an entity might 
be found liable of predatory pricing.  First, an entity needs to offer a product 
at artificially low prices; second, the low pricing results in driving out 
competitors; and finally, the entity raises prices above what is nominal in a 
competitive market.106 
Unlike other entities, like Intellectual Venture, that aggregate patents in 
order to make a return on investment; the LOT Network does not directly set 
prices for or controls patents.107  An argument can be made that the LOT 
Network offers its patents at lower costs to those inside the network — that 
the cross licensing is a cover for establishing market dominance.  Or that the 
prices of the patents are depressed and therefore will lead to a subsequent 
rise in prices of the good produced.  Perhaps a downstream manufacturer 
bought a LOT-pledged patent from a PAE and now must negotiate with 
competitor inside the LOT Network who holds a license. 
However, competition is a good thing; after all, antitrust law protects 
competition, not competitors.108  Patents inside the LOT Network remain 
with their respective owners, and only a nonexclusive license is granted upon 
a triggering event.  That alone would not establish market dominance for 
LOT participants — it simply grants a defensive shield against PAE 
litigation and potentially a license to practice the patent.  And finally, as 
 
 106.  See Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 (1986). 
 107.  See Ewing & Feldman; supra note 4, at 10–12 (Intellectual Ventures licenses or sell 
patents “on demand” to third party companies, sometimes under the threat of litigation or filing 
lawsuits for infringement.). 
 108.  See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993). 
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others now hold a full license to practice a patent, that could mean more 
competitors and potentially lower prices. 
Competitor and downstream costs are unaffected by participating in the 
LOT Network.  For example, imagine a three-tiered distributions chain.  
Company A (LOT) is the first component maker, Company B (LOT) 
incorporates Company A’s inputs, and Company C (non-LOT) finishes the 
consumer widget with Company B’s components.  Now imagine that 
Company A goes bankrupt and sells its entire portfolio to a PAE.  This 
triggers Company B (and all other LOT participants) to receive a fully vested 
license to Company A’s patents, including the ones used for Company B’s 
inputs.  Since Company B is immune to suits for any components derived 
from Company A’s patents, so long as B can continue to source those parts 
(or make it themselves) prices will generally be unaffected (at least directly 
related to being a LOT member) since they do not have to worry about a 
potential lawsuit.  Company C, on the other hand, might be liable since they 
use the component that includes a part from Company A.  However, by the 
first sale doctrine, buying the part from Company B actually frees it from the 
patent monopoly.109  Thus, the consumers do not experience a price increase.  
In fact, the consumer benefits and it is likely that the LOT Network will not 
be liable for predatory pricing. 
C. Discouraging Innovation 
Another concern of the regulatory Agencies is that a patent pooling 
arrangements “could discourage R&D, new product development, and cost-
reducing process innovations.”110  In an arrangement involving horizontal 
competitors, the Agencies look at whether the effects are pro-competitive 
(efficiency-enhancing) or do not diminish competition among competitors 
or potential competitors.111 
The LOT Network is unlikely to be seen as an impediment to innovation 
despite a possible drop in the market value of the LOT patents.  In certain 
circumstances, the value of the patents transferred may be reduced because 
some buyers would not value the patent as much as a non-burdened patent.112  
However, “[i]t is the overall benefit of society, rather than the benefits to an 
 
 109.  See Feldman, supra note 25, at 147. 
 110.  See Wallace v. IBM, 467 F.3d 1104, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 111.  See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 24. 
 112.  David L. Hayes & Eric C. Schulman, A Proposal for a License on Transfer (LOT) 
Agreement, (July 27, 2013) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224355. (Working 
Draft – For Discussion Purposes Only Updated July 27, 2013). 
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individual inventor, that is paramount to the patent system.”113  As the LOT 
Agreement continues to apply to patents after a sale, certain buyers may be 
hesitant to purchase a LOT-pledged patent.  These buyers do not have much 
to worry about: so long as the buyer is not or does not become a PAE, the 
LOT licenses will not trigger. 
Buyers, including PAEs are not actually precluded from purchasing any 
patents.  Instead, PAEs who acquire one of these patents can still use them 
for whatever nefarious reasons they desire, just not against LOT members.  
Also, LOT Network does not compete with other patent pools or aggregators 
in the purchasing and licensing of patents.  In fact, other defensive patent 
aggregators can acquire a LOT-pledged patent to cross license to their own 
subscribers.  Thus, the market price for patents should be largely unaffected 
by who is within or outside the LOT Network.  Since the market rate for 
patents should not be affected, innovation should not be negatively impacted 
just because a patent is part of the LOT Network. 
Similarly, the LOT Network could be seen as a field of use restriction 
— a limit on what a licensee is able to do with a patented product.  Usually 
a limit would be placed on what the licensee is able to make with a patented 
invention.114  Courts have been inconsistent in their results and analysis 
regarding the validity of a field of use restriction.115  As a general matter, 
however, courts usually allow any restrictions on downstream products that 
contain a patented product as a component.116 
Under a similar analysis, the LOT Network can be seen as a limit on 
what a PAE can do with a LOT-pledged patent.  The PAE who acquires or 
is licensed a LOT-pledged patent is limited on the amount of companies that 
they will be able to assert the patent against.  However, since a PAE does not 
actually product anything, this is not the type of behavior that antitrust 
agencies would traditionally be concerned with. 
D. Pro-competitive Benefits 
Restraints in a licensing agreement that do not have anticompetitive 
effects are usually unchallenged by the Agencies.  If, however, the Agencies 
 
 113.  Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003). 
 114.  See Feldman, supra note 25, at 145; see, e.g., Barr Rubber Prod. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 
277 F. Supp. 484, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) aff’g 425 F.2d. 1114 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that a patent 
holder can license one firm their process while denying the same process to other licensees). 
 115.  See Feldman, supra note 25, at 146. 
 116.  Id. at 150–151; see also Monsanto v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding 
that Monsanto held rights to second-generation soybean seeds because the seeds contained 
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find that a restraint is likely to have an anticompetitive effect, the Agencies 
will first determine if the restraint is reasonably necessary and then weigh 
the restraint against the pro-competitive benefits.117 
As mentioned above, there is little risk that the LOT Network will be 
seen to be anticompetitive.  But, in the event that a restraint is seen as such, 
the anticompetitive risks “may be insignificant compared to the expected 
efficiencies . . .”118 
The main benefit of the LOT Network is the reduction in viable patents 
available to PAEs, hopefully leading to a reduction in patent litigation by 
disarmament.  The LOT Network benefits LOT users in two ways: direct 
protection and long-term risk reduction.119  First, LOT members are 
protected from litigation involving specific patents transferred by another 
member to a PAE.  Second, with a lessened threat of possible litigation, 
companies could divert money that would otherwise be earmarked for 
litigation into R&D.  The risk reduction increases, as more operating 
companies become a part of the LOT Network. 
Although there is little risk that the LOT Network will raise any alarms 
about impermissible horizontal coordination, competitors can benefit from 
the LOT model.  By obtaining full licenses to specific patents, a competitor 
in the LOT Network can possibly make that specific invention after a transfer 
to a PAE.  This is good for downstream buyers because there is potentially a 
new supplier that can provide the invention without the risk of being sued by 
the new patent owner.  Also, the LOT Network “provides like-minded 
companies with a self-help approach to the dramatic increase in patent 
litigation.”120 
In addition, “[r]estraints that encourage licensees to develop and market 
the licensed technology or that reduce the transaction costs of licensing the 
technology are more likely to be found reasonable.”121  The restraints placed 
on the LOT-pledged patents would help develop and market technologies by 
reducing the chances of a PAE suit and subsequently reallocating resources 
away from a litigation fund.  It also alleviates some uncertainty in supply 
chains.  Buying from suppliers that are at risk for patent infringement (even 
if unmerited) increases the risk to the entire supply chain — upstream sellers 
risk losing sales and downstream buyers risk losing a supplier.  By 
 
 117.  See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 21. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21. 
 120.  Hayes & Schulman, supra note 112, at 3. 
 121.  See Antitrust Enforcement & IP Rights, supra note 87, at 10. 
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inoculating portions of the supply chain, in certain settings, may lead to 
lower costs, lower indemnification obligations, and higher outputs. 
Further, these restraints protect members from privateering — “a 
practice where an operating company sells patents to a troll hoping the troll 
will then attack its competitors.”122   Privateering can raise rivals’ costs “by 
increasing the ability or incentives to enforce the transferred patents.”123  
Although the LOT Network protects participants from the threat of 
privateering, members are still free to sue one another.  However, the threat 
of litigation from another LOT member would probably be for a merited 
claim and unlikely to raise costs like a PAE litigation.  Presumably a 
settlement obtained by a privateering PAE would cause an operating 
company “higher costs, lower sales, and impaired scale” and consumers 
“higher prices in both the short term (because the PAE is induced to seek a 
running royalty when it otherwise might prefer an immediate lump sum 
payment) and the long term (from impairment of rivals).”124  Thus, the 
conditional licenses granted by the LOT Agreement may lower transactional 
costs for LOT participants. 
Given the range of pro-competitive benefits to LOT members and 
perhaps others in the supply chain, it would be difficult for a regulatory 
Agency to find that the LOT Network runs afoul of antitrust laws. 
V. Conclusion 
The current state of the patent system begs for innovative measures to 
curb abuse by PAEs.  The LOT Network is merely one method by private 
entities attempting to curb PAE initiated lawsuits.  The LOT Agreement is a 
carefully crafted patent licensing agreement that should be able to withstand 
an antitrust scrutiny by PAEs and reduce the amount of PAE suits based on 
patents obtained from operating companies.  It neither provides a vehicle for 
horizontal coordination nor discourages innovation.  The LOT Agreement 
provides many pro-competitive benefits in increasing the freedom to operate 
for operating companies.  When smaller companies fail and sell patents to 
PAEs, the LOT Agreement protects the remaining members of the pool 
against the threat of litigation. 
 
 122.  Belcher & Casey, supra note 15, at 14. 
 123.  Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Patent Assertion Entities, 
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445, 456 (2014). 
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Although antirust agencies and laws continue to evolve, the pro-
competitive aspects of the LOT Agreement will mean that it will continue to 
be an attractive option for operating companies that wish to reduce the risk 
of PAE litigation. 
 
